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Incident
In our previous issue, the Journal devoted considerable space to the intro-
duction of the "incident" as a genre in the study of international law. As
explained in that issue, an incident is an international dispute that has been
appraised by relevant international actors for its lawfulness, but in an infor-
mal, nonjudicial setting, and which shapes or reinforces elite expectations
about lawfulness. Readers are referred to Volume 10, Issue I of the Journal
for a detailed treatment of the genre and its methodology, together with four
case studies. With this issue, we introduce the incident study as a regular
section of the Journal.
The Argentine Invasion of the Falklands and
International Norms of Signalling
Michael P. Socarrast
I. Problem
Among the forms of communication through which states conduct
their relations is the tacit exchange of messages, or "signalling." ' For
example, when state A temporarily recalls its ambassador from state B,
established norms which are used by the international community to in-
terpret signals lead state B to see the act as a message of A's displeasure
at the current course of their relationship. Similar interpretive norms are
used to ascribe increasing seriousness to the complete withdrawal of an
ambassador, and finally to the rupture of diplomatic relations. In the
years preceding the Falklands2 War of 1982, the United Kingdom and
Argentina exchanged signals concerning their dispute over the legal sta-
t J.D. Candidate, Yale University.
1. "There are many ways other than verbal declarations by which states may communicate
their intentions." G. SNYDER, DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE: TOWARD A THEORY OF NA-
TIONAL SECURITY 252 (1961). The term "signals" here means "statements or actions the
meanings of which are established by tacit or explicit understandings among the actors." R.
JERVIS, THE LOGIC OF IMAGES IN INTERNA'IONAL RELATIONS 18 (1970). Examples of sig-
nals include "diplomatic notes, military maneuvers, extending or breaking diplomatic rela-
tions, and choosing the shape of a negotiating table." Id.
2. Argentina refers to these islands as Las Islas Malvinas. The choice of the term "Falk-
land Islands" throughout this article is made for convenience only. It does not reflect a judg-
ment on the merits of either party's sovereignty claim. See Reisman, The Struggle for the
Falklands, 93 YALE L.J. 287, 287 n.1 (1983).
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tus of the Falkland Islands. Generally accepted interpretive norms indi-
cate that British signals conveyed an animus derelinquendi-a
willingness to abandon-with respect to the Falklands, while Argentine
signals conveyed increasing Argentine authority over the islands. Argen-
tina relied to some extent upon the British signals to calculate that the
United Kingdom would not attempt a reoccupation of the islands after
their occupation by Argentina.3 The Argentine estimate of British inten-
tions proved incorrect, and the result of that misinterpretation was a
costly war and the fall of the Argentine government.
Did Argentina misinterpret British signals? Are international norms
of signalling so unclear that both states disagreed in good faith on the
meaning of their respective signals? Did this failure of tacit communica-
tion norms weaken those norms? What does that failure indicate about
the place of signalling norms in the international legal system?
This Study will first present a summary of the facts surrounding the
Falklands War. It will then discuss Argentine and British claims con-
3. In Jervis's sense, see supra note 1, the meaning of the signals at issue in this Article will
be ascertained with reference to the system of customary international norms on the acquisi-
tion of territorial title through displays of authority and acquiescence. According to one such
norm, where two states dispute sovereignty over a territory and one of them fails to object to a
multilateral agreement explicitly referring to the territory in dispute as belonging to the other
state, the first state is held to have acquiesced to a display of authority by the second state over
the disputed area. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B,
No. 53, at 68-69 (Judgment of Apr. 4, 1933). Cf. Islands of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.
Int'l Arb. Awards 829 (1928) (Dutch displays of authority over an island and effective Spanish
acquiescence in such displays established Dutch title, weakening a claim of the United States
as pretended successor to Spain). Similarly, British failure to object to United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 2065, which urged Anglo-Argentine negotiations over the Falklands af-
ter identifying the islands as territories in the process of decolonization, could reasonably be
seen as a British signal of acquiescence in the evolution of Argentine title to the Falklands.
G.A. Res. 2065, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 57, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965). See L.
SCHOPEN, H. NEWCOMBE, C. YOUNG & J. WERT, NATIONS ON RECORD: UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY ROLL-CALL VOTES (1946-1973), at 200, 442 (1975) (United Kingdom
vote abstaining from General Assembly Resolution 2065).
It cannot be doubted, however, that the British signal in that instance was ambiguous. Yet,
despite some ambiguity, certain types of signals have more potency than verbal declarations
because of what Snyder calls "the accretion of custom and precedent." G. SNYDER, supra note
1, at 254. For example, "[i]t is a convention of international life that when a country starts
maneuvering its forces clearly for demonstrative purposes, its patience is wearing thin, or it
really 'means business."' Id. Against this background of international practice, when Argen-
tine naval vessels fire upon foreign ships in Falklands waters, that incident may be deemed on
grounds of territorial defense to send a signal to Britain that Argentina "means business."
When Britain fails to respond to those Argentine actions, such behavior sends a signal of
British acquiescence.
There must be a distinction between the problem at issue here, which centers on whether
Britain communicated to Argentina an animus derelinquendi regarding the Falkland territo-
ries, and a separate inquiry into whether on April 1, 1982, Argentina possessed better title to
those territories than Britain. The latter determination would have been made by a competent
tribunal had the parties repaired to one. The Argentine claim presented here alleges that Brit-
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cerning the pattern of signals preceding the Argentine attack, and con-
sider whether those claims are based on conflicting conceptions of
lawfulness. Finally, the Study will examine the outcome of the incident,
present the international appraisal it received, and assess its impact upon
legal norms regarding the ongoing process of tacit communication. The
Study concludes that the incident weakened established norms of signal-
ling, and that in substantial part the failure of tacit communication here
lay in both the inherent imprecision of signals and in the jurisprudential
assumption underlying the norms that group actors generally behave
rationally.
II. Facts
The United Kingdom and Argentina have disputed sovereignty over
the Falkland Islands4 since at least 1833, when British warships evicted
Argentine settlers and lowered the Argentine flag.5 The latest in a long-
running series of attempts to resolve that dispute, in fact, failed only
about a month before the war began. As late as February 27, 1982, Ar-
gentine and British diplomats met in New York to negotiate the future of
the archipelago but emerged without satisfactory results.6 In March,
British intelligence repeatedly warned Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher that some military confrontation appeared unavoidable in the
wake of that diplomatic failure.7
Those intelligence assessments were vindicated on April 2, 1982, when
Argentine forces occupied the islands and established military control
ain reneged on the tacit understanding between the parties that had developed over two de-
cades of signalling.
4. The Falkland Islands lie in the South Atlantic, some 772 kilometers north-east of Cape
Horn. They comprise 200 islands and cover a total land area of 11,961 square kilometers.
There are two large islands, East Falkland and West Falkland. Apart from a number of small
islands, the Dependencies consist of South Georgia, 1287 kilometers east-south-east of the
Falkland Islands, and the uninhabited South Sandwich Islands, some 756 kilometers south-
east of South Georgia. Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples, 4 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 23) at 20, U.N. Doc. A/33/23 Rev. 1 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Report of the Special Committee]. The population of the Falklands and Depen-
dencies is mainly of British origin, and numbered less than 2000 in April 1982. N.Y. Times,
Apr. 3, 1982, at A6, col. 4. They are governed by a Governor appointed by the British govern-
ment, a six-member Executive Council, and an eight-member Legislative Council comprised of
six locally elected members and two appointed by the Governor. Id.
5. M. HASTINGS & S. JENKINS, THE BATTLE FOR THE FALKLANDS 5-6 (1983); C.
SEGRETI, TRES ARCHIPELAGOS ARGENTINOS 108-10 (1983).
6. SUNDAY TIMES OF LONDON INSIGHT TEAM, WAR IN THE FALKLANDS 21-30 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as WAR IN FALKLANDS].
7. Id. at 71 ("British [intelligence] officials concluded that. . . Argentina was preparing to
invade. They even predicted the exact date of the invasion.").
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over them.8 The next day the Prime Minister faced an emergency session
of the House of Commons ringing with demands for the resignation of
key ministers.9 She asserted "that the Falklands Islands and their depen-
dencies remain British territory," defended the "democratic rights of the
islanders" to remain under British rule, and pledged "to see that the is-
lands are freed from occupation and are returned to British administra-
tion at the earliest possible moment."10 To pursue that objective she
announced that a large Royal Navy task force would leave for the Falk-
lands in two days." Within 24 hours she had accepted the resignations of
the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Lord Carrington, and his two
principal assistants on Falklands matters.'2
In Argentina, the events of April 2 were received with public jubilation
and general support for the governing military council led by President
Leopoldo Galtieri. 13 Although Argentine Foreign Minister Nicanor
Costa M6ndez had envisioned the attack as a "short coup" to create a
diplomatic crisis and accelerate the process of decolonization,' 4 President
Galtieri declared to cheering crowds that "not one meter would ever be
given back to the invaders."' 15
The international community also responded to the crisis. The United
Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 502 on April 3, demanding
an immediate cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal of all Argentine
forces, and calling for a diplomatic resolution.16 The European Economic
Community agreed on April 9 to oppose the Argentine invasion and rec-
ommended economic sanctions. 17 Its member states quickly banned all
8. HOUSE OF COMMONS, THE FALKLANDS CAMPAIGN 4 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
FALKLANDS CAMPAIGN].
9. N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1982, at Al, col. 6. In the view of certain Members of Parliament
in the Prime Minister's own party, the invasion placed in question the Prime Minister's sur-
vival in office. Id. at A18, col. 3.
10. FALKLANDS CAMPAIGN, supra note 8, at 5.
11. Id. at 7-8.
12. WAR IN FALKLANDS, supra note 6, at 100-01.
13. M. HASTINGS & S. JENKINS, supra note 5, at 75. Only a few days earlier, serious civil
disturbances in Buenos Aires, under a labor slogan of "Peace, Bread, and Jobs," led to four
hundred arrests. La Prensa, Mar. 31, 1982, at 1, cols. 5, 8.
14. Interview with the Honorable Nicanor Costa M6ndez, Foreign Minister of Argentina,
in New Haven (Apr. 27, 1984) (notes on file with the Yale Journal of International Law)
("Argentina's plan was not to fight a war with Britain, nor was it Argentina's decision to take
over and maintain the islands, but to have a very short coup to call attention from [sic] the
Secretary General or big powers to intervene").
15. WAR IN FALKLANDS, supra note 6, at 122 (quoting senior official's account of
Galtieri's speech). According to the Sunday Times of London, a senior Argentine official re-
vealed to them that Costa M6ndez "wanted to resign" when he heard Galtieri's balcony bra-
vado. Id. Galtieri reportedly told Costa M~ndez: "Don't worry, we can't lose!" Id.
16. Id. at 112.
17. Id. at 120-21.
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imports from Argentina. 8 Among Britain's allies, only the United States
expressed any reluctance to support the U.K.
U.S. policy was tied to efforts to mediate a peaceful solution to the
crisis. Secretary of State Alexander Haig took the initiative and engaged
in shuttle diplomacy between April 8 and 29.19 When that effort failed,
President Reagan declared on April 30 that the United States would
make available military supplies to Britain and impose economic sanc-
tions on Argentina.20
The failure of negotiations and the alignment of powerful industrial
nations behind Britain accompanied the opening of the British military
campaign to recapture the islands. Military operations proceded rapidly.
British forces seized South Georgia on April 25.21 British task force air-
craft bombed the airstrip at the Falklands's capital, Stanley, on May 1.22
The sinking of a large Argentine cruiser on May 2 with its accompanying
heavy loss of life confirmed that a diplomatic crisis had become a war.23
Heavy land, sea, and air warfare continued until Argentine forces surren-
dered on June 14.24
Not surprisingly, the two countries blame each other for the immedi-
ate causes of the outbreak of hostilities. The following section examines
what the two states could muster in support of conflicting signalling
claims.
III. Conflicting Claims
Neither Argentina nor Britain made official claims with respect to sig-
nalling in connection with the war.25 However, the lack of formal claims
is no obstacle to this analysis, since the concern here is with using the
dispute to judge its impact on -international norms of signalling. Norms
regarding the process of signalling shaped the Argentine decision to in-
vade the Falklands. Since Argentina took the first step in the recent hos-
tilities, one can analyze the conflict by proposing a signalling claim on
Argentina's behalf and estimating whether the circumstances in which
that step was taken support the terms of the imputed claim. One should
also advance a counterclaim in Britain's defense and determine whether
18. Id. at 121. See also C. KANAF, LA BATALLA DE LAS MALVINAS 131 (1982).
19. WAR IN FALKLANDS, supra note 6, at 135-43.
20. M. HASTINGS & S. JENKINS, supra note 5, at 141-42.
21. WAR IN FALKLANDS, supra note 6, at 152-53.
22. Id. at 160-61.
23. A. GAVSHON & D. RICE, THE SINKING OF THE BELGRANO 101-03 (1984).
24. See generally C. KANAF, supra note 18; M. HASTINGS & S. JENKINS, supra note 5.
25. Argentine Foreign Minister Costa M6ndez made no signalling claim on April 3, 1982,
during his speech to the United Nations Security Council, see infra note 64.
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its terms find support in the circumstances of the incident. Having estab-
lished that both claims find support in the circumstances of the incident,
one can proceed to evaluate which claim prevailed in the outcome of the
incident. Learning why one side prevailed will illuminate the role of sig-
nalling norms in the incident and whether the incident strengthened or
weakened them.
The unarticulated Argentine claim can be constructed as follows:
The signals long preceding our decision to invade the Malvinas told us
that Britain was not really serious about its sovereignty claim, was prepared
to acquiesce to displays of increasingly sovereign Argentine authority over
the islands, and was indeed pursuing a policy of abandonment with respect
to its sovereignty claim. In departing from its tacitly communicated policy,
Britain violated international norms of tacit communication or
"signalling."
This claim derives from the generally accepted view that the Argentine
leadership never expected a strong British or international response and
that its decision was based on that expectation. 26
The British government would not be likely to concede any merit in
the Argentine claim advanced here.27 Agreeing publicly would have
been very costly at home, amounting to a confession of inconsistency,
irresponsibility, or a clandestine betrayal of the official national policy
towards the islands. The British demurrer, had it been publicly articu-
lated, would have suggested that the Argentine leadership was wrong to
draw inferences of British acquiescence from the events leading up to the
invasion. The facts examined below make clear the disingenuousness of
such a counterclaim. The British government could more convincingly
justify its reaction to the Argentine seizure as follows:
26. In support of this formulation of the Argentine claim, Foreign Minister Costa M~ndez
told the author that Argentina invaded in part because "we had signals that Britain would not
send the Fleet because it would be very expensive, would affect the commitment to NATO,
and even if sent the results were not all for sure." Interview with the Honorable Nicanor
Costa Mrndez, supra note 14. He also stated that those signals from Britain
were rather confusing. They wanted to have the cake and eat it too. They wanted to
spend nothing, didn't protest the Argentine takeover of the Sandwich Islands and did not
protest in the case of the Russian fishing boats. The Foreign Office and the British Gov-
ernment were divided. But we knew that even if the signals were confusing the negotia-
tions had no future.
Id. See also M. HASTINGS & S. JENKINS, supra note 5, at 60 ("Costa Mendez also continued in
his firm view that the diplomatic consequences could be contained and no military reoccupa-
tion by Britain would be attempted. In his defense, it should be said that there were sound
empirical grounds for his view. . . ."). The Argentine Foreign Ministry may also have
counted on Soviet support at the United Nations. Id at 48-49.
27. Prime Minister Thatcher declared to the House of Commons on April 3, 1982, that the
Argentine invasion "has not a shred of justification and not a scrap of legality." FALKLANDS
CAMPAIGN, supra note 8, at 4.
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Perhaps Argentina was justified in interpreting our previous lack of re-
solve on behalf of our official sovereignty position as an indication of our
willingness to allow some weakening of our title, but Argentina went too far
in concluding that those precedents would permit them to invade the Falk-
lands openly without a stern British response. 28
Britain might counterclaim that the Argentine claim was a rationaliza-
tion, and that the junta had decided to invade as a result of domestic
unrest unrelated to any theories of right or perceptions of British sig-
nals. 29 This potential counterclaim, accusing the Argentines of hypoc-
risy, will not be treated here. Unless one thinks that it behaved totally
irrationally, the junta's decision to order military action required a pros-
pect of success even if it was primarily intended to distract attention from
domestic problems. The key gamble depended on the strength of British
and international reaction as gauged from various signals.
The credibility of the claims imputed to Argentina and Britain must be
ascertained through careful examination of the pattern of signals in the
years before the war. One starting point is the 1965 United Nations reso-
lution that first classified the Falklands as territories in the process of
decolonization.
28. Shortly after her "not a scrap of legality" remark on April 3, 1982, id., the Prime
Minister more soberly noted that:
[t]here had, of course, been previous incidents affecting sovereignty before the one in
South Georgia .... In December 1976 the Argentines illegally set up a scientific station
on one of the dependencies within the Falklands group - Southern Thule. The Labour
Government attempted to solve the matter through diplomatic exchanges, but without
success. The Argentines remained there and are still there ....
Id at 5. The Prime Minister's remarks hint at a recognition that Britain had acquiesced in the
Argentine seizure of Falklands territory on prior occasions, but she was apparently drowned
out by protest before she could clearly distinguish between those earlier Argentine derogations
of British claims and the one at issue on April 3, 1982.
29. There could be other British responses to the Argentine claim. The first is a possible
British counterclaim accusing the Argentines of being the ones who violated the norms of
signalling. The official British investigation considered such a counterclaim when it stated that
"Argentina had previously made threatening noises, accompanied by bellicose press comment,
and indeed backed up its threats with aggressive actions, without the dispute developing into a
serious confrontation." THE RT. HON. THE LORD FRANKS, CHAIRMAN, FALKLANDS IS-
LANDS REVIEW-REPORT OF A COMMITTEE OF PRIVY COUNSELLORS, para. 296 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as FRANKS REPORT]. This allegation suggests that Argentina signalled to
the United Kingdom that it would not invade the Falklands irrespective of appearances.
The Franks Report dismissed this counterclaim. The Report noted that this view of Argen-
tine intentions was unfounded and exerted an undue influence on British policymaking. Id,
Indeed, almost each case of Argentine sabre-rattling at official levels was followed up by some
sort of material affront to British sovereignty. The severity of these affronts increased over
time.
Another possible British counterclaim would be that the British strategy of "understated
response" was a rational policy not intended to signal acquiescence to Argentine aggression,
but meant instead to reduce the risk of armed conflict. This theory lacks merit because the
facts presented here show that the British elite knew at the highest levels how dangerously its
actions were being interpreted in Argentina.
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A. Operation Condor and its Aftermath
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2065 of December 16,
1965,30 from which the United Kingdom abstained, linked the Falklands
to the international effort to decolonize, and invited British-Argentine
negotiations on the subject. A year later, in September 1966, "Operation
Condor" revealed the vulnerability of the Falklands and their isolation
from British power. Operation Condor involved the hijacking by twenty
armed Argentine civilians of an Argentine government DC-4 airplane to
Port Stanley, the capital of the Falkland Islands. Massive demonstra-
tions in Buenos Aires supported this apparently unofficial action.
Operation Condor was anunofficial Argentine signal that the Falk-
lands were vulnerable to paramilitary incursions and that Argentina
could back up its territorial claim with military force.31 The British gov-
ernment had foreseen such a signal at least eighteen months before Oper-
ation Condor. A March 1965 British Joint Intelligence Committee
report estimating the vulnerability of the islands singled out such adven-
turist, unofficial action as the type of incident most likely to induce a
radical and rapid change in Argentine public opinion and official pol-
icy.32 It remains unknown whether the Argentine government sent the
Operation Condor signal, but it is at least the case that some group in
Argentina with access to weapons was clearly signalling a strong com-
mitment to Argentine sovereignty over the Falklands.
The British government's actions in the wake of Operation Condor
clearly indicate that it received the signal. The immediate British re-
sponse was to increase its military presence on the Falkland Islands from
one officer and five men to a full platoon (about 40 men)-a number
which remained roughly constant until the 1982 invasion.33 However,
diplomatic aquiescence far overshadowed the signal sent by the increased
military presence. Within six months of the incident, the British govern-
ment proposed a "sovereignty freeze" for a minimum of thirty years, af-
ter which the Islanders would be free to choose between British and
30. G.A. Res. 2065, supra note 3.
31. See FRANKS REPORT, supra note 29, para. 21. It makes little difference whether the
operation was an act of official Argentine policy, planned with the knowledge and participation
of the Foreign Ministry and the President of the Republic, or whether prior knowledge of the
operation was limited to lower functionaries or a small group elsewhere within the politico-
military structure. The operation signalled to Britain the continued immediacy of the Argen-
tine claim, and the British response signalled the remarkable weakness of British commitment
to its claim.
32. FRANKS REPORT, supra note 29, para. 19. For a description of the role and composi-
tion of the Joint Intelligence Committee, see id. Annex B paras. 13-15.
33. FRANKS REPORT, supra note 29, para. 21. The number did not increase substantially
before April, 1982. M. HASTINGS & S. JENKINS, supra note 5, at 72.
363
Yale Journal of International Law
Argentine rule.34
Argentina rejected the British offer,35 thereby reemphasizing the seri-
ousness of its legal claim. The British government responded in March
1967 by telling Argentina for the first time that Her Majesty would im-
mediately "cede sovereignty" of the Falklands under certain condi-
tions. 36 Britain first stated to Argentina that it would condition its
recognition of Argentina's sovereignty on the Falkland Islanders's
"wishes." '37 Negotiations then stalled when the Falkland Islands Council
alarmed the British Parliament with allegations of an impending cession
of sovereignty, provoking widespread political opposition in Britain.38
The British government finally reached an agreement with Argentina in
August 1968 on a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the official
conditions for the cession of British sovereignty. It stated concern for
the Islanders' "interests" instead of guaranteeing their "wishes." '39
These events establish that the signal sent by Operation Condor signifi-
cantly. affected subsequent policy decisions at the highest levels of the
British government. Argentina benefited relatively quickly from Opera-
tion Condor, even though the British public opposed diplomatic conces-
sions on sovereignty. The British concessions in the months after
Operation Condor amounted to a British signal that Argentine para-mili-
tary affronts to British sovereignty would weaken the British claim to
sovereignty, as well as the Islanders' claim to self-determination.
B. Deteriorating Relations
The new British policy of negotiating away Her Majesty's sovereignty
claim encountered increasingly sharp political opposition and critical
press coverage. Following a rebellion by backbenchers on December 11,
1968, the British Cabinet abandoned the Memorandum of Understand-
ing as a basis for settlement of the dispute.4°
34. FRANKS REPORT, supra note 29, para. 22. A report submitted to the British Defence
and Overseas Policy Committee prior to these negotiations stated that Argentina could easily





39. Id. para. 23. Publication of the Memorandum of Understanding "was to be accompa-
nied by a unilateral" British government statement which made conformity with the Islanders'
wishes an absolute condition for recognizing Argentine sovereignty. Id. para. 24.
40. Id. para. 25. The Cabinet based its decision to abandon the Memorandum of Under-
standing on the refusal of the Argentine government to insert a clause in the Memorandum
making a British recognition of Argentine cession of sovereignty subject to the "wishes" of the
approximately 1600 Islanders, or to link the Memorandum to the British unilateral publication
statement. Id.
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However, according to the Franks Report, earlier in 1968 the British
government had recognized that "failure to reach an understanding with
Argentina carried the risks of increased harassment of the Islanders and
the possibility of an attack. The Government therefore decided to en-
deavor to continue negotiations with Argentina while making clear the
British attitude on sovereignty."''a The Foreign and Commonwealth Sec-
retary told Parliament on December 11, 1968, that Britain would con-
tinue to negotiate. 42
The British government pursued this negotiation strategy from 1968
until 1974. 43 Discussions from 1969 to 1971 continued under a "sover-
eignty umbrella" and focused on improving communications and other
ties between Argentina and the Falkland Islanders.44 Argentina's policy
during this period apparently was to cooperate with British efforts to tie
the Islands more closely to the Argentine mainland. During those two
years of relative harmony, the two governments reached accords on sev-
eral issues, including the provision of scholarships for Falklanders wish-
ing to study on the Argentine mainland, the construction of an airstrip to
link Port Stanley to Argentina, the issuance of Argentine immigration
documents to the Islanders, reciprocal exemptions from duties and taxes,
and an exemption for Islanders from Argentine military service.45 Brit-
ish willingness to enter into these agreements supports the Argentine
claim that the agreements indicated a British readiness to allow the Falk-
landers to become Argentine subjects.
Even as Argentina began to implement these cooperative ventures, it
pressed for a resumption of talks on sovereignty and conditioned its will-
ingness to discuss further ties with the Islanders on the British govern-
ment's acceptance of sovereignty negotiations.46 An impasse on the
sovereignty issue led Argentina to seek and obtain the passage in 1973 of
UN General Assembly Resolution 3160 urging renewed negotiations on
sovereignty in 1973.47
At the end of that year, British intelligence reported for the first time
that the Per6n government might be preparing contingency plans for the
military occupation of the Falklands.48 As a result of these develop-
41. Id.
42. OFFICIAL REPORT, HOUSE OF COMMONS, 11 December 1968, cols. 424-34.
43. FRANKS REPORT, supra note 29, paras. 25-30.
44. Id. para. 26. For example, in December 1971 the two governments issued a joint state-
ment establishing new patterns of cooperation between the Falklands and Argentina. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. para. 27.
47. Id. para. 129. See G.A. Res. 3160, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 108, U.N. Doc.
A/9030 (1973).
48. FRANKS REPORT, supra note 29, para. 32.
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ments, the British Defence Committee proposed exploring the idea of a
British-Argentine condominium over the Falklands. The Falklands
Council indicated that it would not object to the proposal.49 Before Ar-
gentina could pursue this new initiative, the British told Argentina in
August 1974 that the Islanders' refusal to attend the negotiations on con-
dominium, even though the Falklanders did not object per se to their
taking place, made such talks pointless. 50 The condominium episode
supports the British claim because it indicated that the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office would continue to follow the formula in the Mem-
orandum of Understanding and safeguard Islander interests. Aban-
doning the islands without Islander participation would require a formal
policy change in Britain.
In December 1974, the Argentine newspaper Cr6nica mounted a cam-
paign advocating an invasion of the Falklands. 51 In April 1975, the Brit-
ish Ambassador to Buenos Aires delivered a warning to Argentine
Foreign Minister Vignes that the U.K. would respond militarily to any
Argentine invasion.5 2 Argentina confirmed indications that its policy
was moving from one of cooperation to a more confrontational posture in
July 1975 when it rejected a British proposal for the joint economic de-
velopment of the South Atlantic territories.5 3 Foreign Minister Vignes
suggested linking any such agreement to a transfer of sovereignty plus a
leaseback to Britain for some years.5 4 He also suggested that Argentina
occupy South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. Britain found
this unacceptable, and negotiations stalled.5 5 These official exchanges of-
fer some foundation for the British claim. They indicate a stiffening of
the British government's attitude after the domestic public debate over
condominium. This stiffening might properly have been interpreted by
the Argentines as a signal that the British sovereignty claim would not be
abandoned, diplomatically or militarily, without Islander agreement.
C. The RSS Shackleton Incident
In October 1975, the United Kingdom announced its decision to com-
mission a report, to be directed by Lord Shackleton, on the long-term
economic potential of the islands. 56 This provoked a sharp response
49. Id. paras. 29, 30.
50. Id. para. 30.
51. Id. para. 31.
52. Id.
53. Id. para. 33.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. para. 34.
366
Vol. 10:356, 1985
Argentine Invasion of the Falklands
from Argentina's Foreign Minister, who warned British Prime Minister
Callaghan on January 2, 1976, that in the absence of further negotiations
their countries would "rapidly mov[e] towards a head-on collision," and
that "[the Argentine] government could accept no responsibility for such
an outcome."' 57 British attempts at conciliation failed to temper the ag-
gressiveness of subsequent statements by the Argentine government and
print media.58
The situation worsened in February when an Argentine destroyer fired
shots at the unarmed British research ship RSS Shackleton seventy-eight
miles south of Port Stanley.5 9 British intelligence reported that the deci-
sion to attack the Shackleton had been made in Buenos Aires six weeks
earlier, but that the Argentine armed forces were nevertheless opposed to
a full-scale military invasion that might help President Isabel Per6n stay
in power.6°
The firing on the Shackleton came after Britain's decision to withdraw
its only armed vessel in the South Atlantic, the ice patrol ship HMS En-
durance.61 As a result of the shooting, Britain retained Endurance on
active service in the area, subject to annual and biannual renewal. 62
Prime Minister Callaghan also agreed to send a Royal Navy frigate to
the South Atlantic.63 The deployment of the frigate was the firmest re-
sponse of any British government to an Argentine challenge during this
period, until, of course, the decision of Prime Minister Thatcher to retake
the islands in 1982.64
57. Id. para. 36.
58. Id. paras. 37, 39. This strong Argentine reaction can be seen as a response-in-kind to
earlier British diplomatic warnings not to occupy territory unilaterally. Both sides had previ-
ously signalled their opposition to unilateral actions in UN General Assembly Resolution
3160, adopted in 1973. See supra note 47.
59. FRANKS REPORT, supra note 29, para. 42. According to the Franks Report the pres-
ence of the Shackleton did not have any connection to the mission led by Lord Shackleton. Id.
60. Id paras. 41, 42. British intelligence indicated that the Argentine decision to intercept
the ship was made by the armed forces, not by the government, and that the Commander-in-
Chief of the Argentine Navy had authorized firing upon the ship without causing casualties or
sinking it. "The Joint Intelligence Committee assessed the purpose of the operation as being
an assertion of Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and surrounding waters, in
order to bring pressure to bear on the British Government to negotiate." Id. para. 42.
61. Id. para. 44. The decision resulted from the 1974 Defence Review. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. para. 45.
64. The deployment was based on the continued view of British intelligence that the main
Argentine threat was harassment. Id. para. 40. One frigate would not have been an adequate
response or deterrent to Argentine military designs more serious than harassment. Neverthe-
less, this response was sufficiently firm to influence Argentine thinking regarding British policy
in the South Atlantic. Argentine Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa M6ndez dedicated four
paragraphs of his Security Council speech of April 3, 1982, to his account of this incident. In
it, he described the British decision as an attempt at intimidation "which constituted a real
threat to my country and to the continent ...." Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two
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The events surrounding the firing on the RSS Shackleton are a sub-
stantial source of support for the British signalling claim. Official Argen-
tine use of armed force upon a symbol of British sovereignty over the
Falklands-a British vessel conducting an economic resources survey in
the vicinity of the islands-met with a strong British military and diplo-
matic response, signalling the limits of British acquiescence.
D. The Southern Thule Incident
Britain's ability to send an effective signal depended in part on intelli-
gence reports of the Argentine armed forces's unwillingness to take deci-
sive action that might bolster President Per6n's popularity. The British
were well aware of their own strategic constraints: a British Chiefs of
Staff paper issued in February 1976, warned that an Argentine invasion
would probably succeed and that Britain could repulse it only by using
all of the Royal Navy's amphibious resources as well as a sizeable task
force.65 This bleak assessment of British military options led the Cal-
laghan government to enter into a fresh round of discussions, culminat-
ing in the passage of General Assembly Resolution 4966 in December
1976. The resolution thanked the government of Argentina for
"facilitat[ing] the process of decolonization" and urged both sides to ex-
pedite negotiations.67 The United Kingdom stood alone in opposing the
resolution.6 8
Against this diplomatic background, on December 20, 1976, the Brit-
ish "discovered the existence of an Argentine military presence" on
Southern Thule in the South Sandwich Islands.6 9 After inquiries from
London, Argentina responded on January 14, 1977, that its intent was to
establish a station on Southern Thule for future scientific investigation
"within the jurisdiction of Argentine sovereignty." Argentina also ex-
pressed the hope "that nothing would cloud the 'auspicious perspectives'
for negotiations," hinting that their presence on Southern Thule would
not be permanent. 70 Five days later, the British government formally
protested the Argentine presence "as a violation of British sovereignty,"
stating that Britain was "entitled to expect" prior consultation and ex-
Thousand Three Hundred and Fiftieth Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2350 (1982). He also ar-
gued that the British deployments near the Falklands "justify and explain the actions taken of
necessity by the Government of Argentina in defense of its rights." Id.
65. FRANKS REPORT, supra note 29, paras. 46, 47.
66. Id. G.A. Res. 49, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 122, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 at 122
(1976).
67. Id.
68. FRANKS REPORT, supra note 20, para. 51.
69. Id. para. 52.
70. Id. para. 53.
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pressing the "hope" that the Argentine "scientific programme was being
terminated. '71
Shortly thereafter, on February 2, 1977, the British government de-
cided that "the time has come to consider both with the Islanders and
the Argentine Government whether a climate exists for discussing the
broad issues which bear on the future of the Falkland Islands, and the
possibilities of cooperation between Britain and Argentina in the region
of the South West Atlantic."'72 The British government emphasized that
it still reserved its positions both on sovereignty and on the need for Is-
lander approval of any agreement.73 Within two months, the govern-
ments agreed to terms of reference for new formal discussions. 74
The outcome of the Southern Thule incident issued an even stronger
signal to the Argentines. While the British responded to the Shackleton
incident with a firm diplomatic protest and a naval deployment against
Argentina, their reaction to the Southern Thule landing communicated
a lack of seriousness on both diplomatic and military levels. Although
HMS Endurance reported the Argentine landing on December 20, 1976,
it was only on January 5, 1977, that the Foreign Office sought an Argen-
tine "explanation". 75 The British took no further action until the Argen-
tines had proferred such an explanation, thereby delaying delivery of
Britain's formal protest until January 19, a month after the landing.76 At
no time did the British government make public the Argentine landing,77
nor did it attempt any forward protest through international channels.
The Southern Thule incident therefore furnishes a strong foundation for
the Argentine signalling claim. Argentina intimidated the British gov-
ernment into stating publicly that "the time ha[d] come" to negotiate on
sovereignty.78 The success of Argentine policy probably surpassed Ar-
gentine expectations, and apparently failed to precipitate a full invasion
71. Id.
72. Id. para. 58.
73. Id.
74. Id. para. 60. The Islanders agreed to those terms of reference, but only under a "sover-
eignty umbrella" and with promises of full consultation with them. Id.
75. Id. para. 52.
76. Id. para. 53. The Franks Report stated that "[t]he Argentine expectation had been that
the British reaction would have been stronger." Id. para. 54.
77. Id. These events did not come to public notice until May 1978. See The Times
(London), Apr. 3, 1981, at 3, col 8.
78. See supra text accompanying note 72. British intelligence expected a hardening of the
Argentine position in the forthcoming negotiations. Intelligence reports also indicated that the
failure of Argentina to prevail in the Papal arbitration of the Beagle Channel dispute with
Chile, and the lack of progress with Brazil in their River Plate Basin dispute, could only
increase Argentine eagerness to press for success in the Falklands dispute. FRANKS REPORT,
supra note 29, para. 62.
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only because Argentina anticipated little if any international support.79
E. The Soviet and Bulgarian Incidents
Before talks between Argentina and Great Britain resumed in New
York, Argentine naval forces detained seven Soviet and two Bulgarian
fishing vessels in Falklands waters during September and October 1977.80
One Bulgarian sailor was wounded by Argentine fire.8 ' Admiral Anaya,
Argentine Naval Attach6 in London 'and later Commander-in-Chief of
the Navy, warned the British Foreign Office that Argentine Admiral
Massera had orders to sink any of the Bulgarian vessels if necessary. 82
The series of incidents during late September and early October 1977
did not directly involve British interests. However, the Argentine in-
terdiction of vessels in Falkland waters amounted to a legal claim of right
which necessarily implicated the British sovereignty claim. The Argen-
tine government warned the British through diplomatic channels of simi-
lar actions in the future against "any other flag carrier and at any other
place."'8 3 The boldness of the Argentine move and the failure of the Brit-
ish government to express strong displeasure in any significant way could
have reinforced Argentine interpretations of the apparant lack of serious-
ness of British intentions which had already been manifested in the
Southern Thule incident.
F. The British Secret Naval Deployment of 1977
After the attack on the Bulgarian and Soviet vessels, the British gov-
ernment secretly decided to deploy two Royal Navy frigates a thousand
miles from the Falkland Islands and a nuclear-powered submarine in the
"immediate vicinity" of the Falklands. 84 The Franks Report asserts that
"Cabinet Committee papers show clearly that it was agreed that the force
should remain covert. We have found no evidence that the Argentine
Government ever came to know of its existence."85
The British government's decision to deploy the force covertly pre-
79. Id. paras. 54, 56.




84. Id. para. 65.
85. Id. para. 66. Then Prime Minister James Callaghan "has said that he ensured that the
[naval] unit's presence was made known through undisclosed channels to the Junta of the
day." A. GAVSHON & D. RICE, supra note 23, at 10. That signal was supposedly to have
reached the Argentines through American intermediaries. Id. Gavshon and Rice prefer the
Franks Report's version, particularly since it is extremely damaging to the Report's own con-
clusion exonerating the Thatcher Government for not foreseeing the 1982 invasion. Id.
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vented the action from being a signal and thus from having any effect on
Argentine perceptions. This missed opportunity to signal was especially
telling in that as with the "firm" British response to the Shackleton inci-
dent, the deployment of two ships and a submarine could not have
barred an Argentine invasion in any case and could not have been
designed to fulfill such a mission.8 6
In any event, the force was withdrawn once the British believed negoti-
ations were going well. 7 During subsequent negotiations the British
proposed joint scientific activities in the Dependencies, a step that
"would have retrospectively legitimized the Argentine presence on
Southern Thule. '" 88 While Islander opposition killed the proposal,89 Ar-
gentina could reasonably claim that the proposal conveyed a signal of
continued British acquiescence in Argentine displays of sovereign
authority.
G. Other Territorial Developments
In the International Herald Tribune of November 6, 1980, the Argen-
tine State Petroleum Company, Yacimientos Petroleros Fiscales (YPF),
invited bids for a contract to drill for oil in an off-shore area called Ma-
gallanes Este. This area straddled the British-declared boundary line be-
tween the Falklands and Tierra del Fuego. 90 On December 9, 1980, the
British government officially protested to Argentina, responding to Ar-
gentine plans to drill oil in the disputed territory. 91 Approximately five
months later, the British government published a notice in the Interna-
tional Herald Tribune warning oil companies of the possibility of legal
action if they drilled in the disputed area.92
The reaction of the Argentine government at the diplomatic level was
to declare the basis of the British protest of December 9, 1980, "flatly
86. British intelligence knew that much more was needed to prevent or defeat a deter-
mined Argentine effort to seize the Falklands. FRANKS REPORT, supra note 29, para. 47.
87. Id. para. 66.
88. Id. para. 68.
89. Id. para. 69. The Islanders's main objection was that, "unless restricted to Southern
Thule, [such cooperation] would give Argentina a further foothold in the Dependencies,
which would start a process leading to eventual loss of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands
themselves." Id.
90. See 2 A. SILENZI DE STAGNI, LAS MALVINAS Y EL PETR6LEO 141 (1983). See also
Report of the Special Committee, supra note 4, paras. 31, 32. (The United Kingdom also
carried out seismic exploration around the Falklands in search of oil. The RRS Shackleton
may have been part of this British effort.) But see supra note 59 (indicating no connection
between the RRS Shackleton and Lord Shackleton's mission).
91. A. SILENZI DE STAGNI, supra note 90, at 136.
92. Id. at 141 (quoting Lord Carrington's statement on subject).
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unacceptable. s93 The Argentine Foreign Office declared that "there does
not exist any boundary in the area in question, for the simple reason that
the whole area corresponds to Argentine sovereignty. ' ' 94 The Argentine
government put teeth into that assertion of sovereignty by signing an
agreement with the Soviet Union that provided for joint exploration and
exploitation of fishing resources "in Argentine waters south of 46 south
latitude, in accord with Argentine legislation in effect." '95
On June 30, 1981, the British Parliament approved the expiry, effective
March 1982, of the commission of HMS Endurance, the only British
armed ship stationed in the South Atlantic.96 On July 27, 1981, the Ar-
gentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a communique warning that
the question of sovereignty could no longer be deferred. 97 Lack of Brit-
ish counter-response, especially in view of the decision to decommission
Endurance, would clearly support an Argentine claim that the British
signalled an animus derelinquendi towards the Falklands.
H. The South Georgia Incident
In December 1981, a private party of alleged Argentine scrap metal
dealers landed without authorization on South Georgia, ostensibly to in-
spect a disused British whaling station for which they had signed an op-
tion contract with an Edinburgh-based firm.98 The Governor of the
Falklands told the British Foreign Office on December 31 that the Ar-
gentine party on South Georgia was violating Dependencies' legislation
by its failure to obtain clearance. 99 The Foreign Office replied that the
Governor should not take action which "would risk provoking a most
serious incident which could escalate and have an unforeseen out-
come." 1° Any action or diplomatic protest would have to wait for fur-
ther developments on South Georgia.101
Although the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires approached the Ar-
93. Id. at 142.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 163 (quoting text verbatim of Ley No. 22.481, Aug. 10, 1981, Protocolo de
Entendimiento Entre la Secretaria de Estado de Intereses Maritimos del Ministerio de
Economia de la Repfiblica Argentina y el Ministerio de Pesca de la Uni6n de Repfiblicas
Socialistas Sovi6ticas Sobre la Colaboraci6n en Materia Pesquera, art. 6).
96. FRANKS REPORT, supra note 29, para. 114. Lord Carrington, the British Foreign Sec-
retary, had argued against the decision, warning that the presence and hydrographic tasks of
Endurance "were an important aspect of the maintainance of the British claim to sovereignty."
Id.
97. Id. para. 97.
98. Id. paras. 161-62.
99. Id. para. 163.
100. Id. para. 164.
101. Id.
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gentine Foreign Ministry on January 6, 1982, he withheld a protest about
events on South Georgia pending an Argentine investigation.10 2 The
protest was delivered on February 9, and Argentina rejected it nine days
later. 103
On March 20, the Governor of the Falklands notified the British For-
eign Office that a sizable Argentine party of civilian and military person-
nel had arrived on South Georgia aboard a different ship. Upon landing,
they had fired shots, raised the Argentine flag, and defaced a posted
warning against unauthorized landings.1 4 The British Ambassador in
Buenos Aires then warned the Argentine Foreign Ministry that the inci-
dent was serious and that "the British Government would have to take
whatever action seemed necessary."10 5 The British government ordered
HMS Endurance to sail to South Georgia. The Falklands Governor in-
structed the British Base Commander at Grytviken, South Georgia, to
tell the Argentines to lower their flag and report to Grytviken.10 6
On March 21, while the Argentines remained at Leith Harbor on
South Georgia, the Argentine Foreign Office officially responded with-
out apology, but expressed the hope that the British would not "exagger-
ate" the significance of the incident. 107 The Argentine naval headquarters
meanwhile congratulated the ship Bahia Buen Suceso (the Good Incident
Bay) on "a successful operation."' 0 8
On March 23, the British Foreign Office canceled the HMS Endur-
ance's orders to confront the Argentine party at Leith. Instead, hoping
to avoid "provocation,"'109 the British ordered the HMS Endurance to
remain at Grytviken. British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington ob-
tained his Argentine counterpart's agreement that removal of the party
at Leith by an Argentine vessel was a "welcomed" suggestion, while Dr.
Costa M6ndez in turn assured Lord Carrington that he would try to ob-
tain the necessary authorization to carry it out.' 10
Yet on March 25, the British received information that Argentine war-
ships had been dispatched to prevent the HMS Endurance from evacuat-
ing the Argentine party at Leith.' London also learned that a. second
102. Id. para. 165.
103. Id.
104. Id. para. 169; C. KANAF, supra note 18, at 18. On March 22, Falkland Islanders
vandalized the Argentine government airline's office in Port Stanley. Id.
105. FRANKS REPORT, supra note 29, para. 169.
106. Id.
107. Id. para. 170. See also C. KANAF, supra note 18, at 98.
108. FRANKS REPORT, supra note 29, para. 175.
109. Id. para. 184.
110. Id. paras. 184-86.
111. Id. para. 193. Cf C. KANAF, supra note 18, at 99-100.
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Argentine ship, previously supposed to be an unarmed scientific vessel,
had brought three military landing craft and a military helicopter to
Leith Harbor. 112 The June 1981 decision to pull the HMS Endurance
out of service was not changed, but she remained temporarily at
Grytviken. 113
The Argentine Commanders-in-Chief met on March 26, and the next
day Dr. Costa M6ndez announced that a firm decision had been reached
to give the Argentine men on South Georgia "all necessary protec-
tion." 114 That same day, the President and Commander-in-Chief of the
Army, General Leopoldo Galtieri, announced to an audience of local
politicians in Buenos Aires that "this year is not the most propitious one
to face fundamental solutions to the political, economic, and social
problems of the Nation." 115
The absence of visible British resolve on behalf of its sovereignty claim
must have confirmed the message of the Southern Thule incident to the
Argentine ruling elite. British inaction also came in the context of the
scheduled decommissioning of the HMS Endurance in March, which the
British government refused to delay for budgetary reasons despite events
on South Georgia. 116 Moreover, the British Foreign Office itself was, or
should have been, aware of the message which decommissioning the En-
durance would send, since Lord Carrington had unsuccessfully argued
that the retention on station of the HMS Endurance was important to the
credibility of the British title claim. 117
The Falkland Islands Council shared this interpretation of the deci-
sion, 118 and it became public knowledge as part of the parliamentary de-
bate on the 1981 Defence Review. All Argentine newspapers that
reported the decision took it to mean that Britain was "abandoning the
protection of the Falkland Islands." ' 1 9 Indeed, British intelligence knew
that Argentina had interpreted the decision as a deliberate political ges-
112. FRANKS REPORT, supra note 29, para. 193.
113. Id. paras. 194, 204.
114. Id. para. 207. See also C. KANAF, supra note 18, at 100.
115. La Prensa, Mar. 27, 1982, at 1, col. 1 ("El presidente habl6 a intendentes bonaer-
enses-Dijo que este afio no es el mis propicio para encarar soluciones de fondo para el
problema politico, econ6mico y social de la Naci6n"). Widespread political unrest had created
public speculation as to whether significant changes in domestic policy would take place. The
unrest took increasingly violent form, including demonstrations in several Argentine cities.
116. See M. HASTINGS & S. JENKINS, supra note 5, at 53 ("Relations between departments
in Mrs. Thatcher's government had, by spring of 1982, become utterly dominated by budget-
ary considerations.").
117. FRANKS REPORT, supra note 29, para. 114.
118. Id. para. 115 ("The people of the Falkland Islands. . . express extreme concern that
Britain appears to be abandoning its defence of British interests in the South Atlantic and
Antarctic at a time when other powers are strengthening their position in these areas.").
119. Id. para. 116.
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ture, not as an expedient measure.120
These events offered Argentina a firm basis for its signalling claim.
After successfully challenging the seriousness of Britain's sovereignty
claim, the Argentine government ordered a full invasion of the Falklands
and Dependencies. However, since the British did not explicitly commu-
nicate their intentions to the Argentines, the question remains whether
Britain's pattern of signals not only makes Argentina's claim plausible
but justifies it. Are there norms of signalling territorial claims which
explain the parties' activities in such a way as to make one claim more
persuasive than the other? The first step must be to outline what these
norms of signalling territorial claims are, by tracing their development in
international law.
IV. Conflicting Conceptions of Lawfulness
The British and Argentine claims formulated above do not differ in
their underlying conception of lawfulness. They do differ in how they
characterize the facts of the dispute, i.e., whether Britain's signals indi-
cated an animus derelinquendi and acquiescence in increasingly bold Ar-
gentine displays of authority over the Falklands. The conflict between
the parties thus centers on the extent to which the norms apply rather
than on the norms themselves. Both parties, explicitly or implicitly, rec-
ognized the role of signalling in such disputes.
The body of customary international law relating to signalling territo-
rial claims, which forms the basis of any interpretation of an adversary's
signals, has been inherited by both countries. It is not unreasonable to
presume that the legal advisers to the respective foreign ministries con-
sulted, or at the very least could have consulted, this body of precedent
when assessing the other party's intentions or when formulating a Xe-
sponse which would signal their own.
A recent indication of customary international law with respect to sig-
nalling territorial claims is the Juridical Regime of Historic Waters of
1962, in which the United Nations International Law Commission re-
stated customary international law regarding the acquisition of historic
title to maritime areas:
There seems to be fairly general agreement that at least three factors have
to be taken into consideration in determining whether a State has acquired
a historic title to a maritime area. These factors are: (1) the exercise of
authority over the area by the State claiming the historic right; (2) the con-
120. Id. ("[Argentines] did not see it as an inevitable economy in Britain's defence budget
since the implications for the Islands . . . were fundamental.").
Yale Journal of International Law
tinuity of this exercise of authority; (3) the attitude of foreign states.121
The International Law Commission noted that the exercise of author-
ity by the claimant state "must have continued over a considerable time;
indeed it must have developed into a usage" in order to satisfy the second
requirement above.122 Regarding the third and admittedly "more con-
troversial" factor, the Commission stated that "[s]ome writers assert that
the acquiescence of other States is required for the emergence of an his-
toric title; others think that absence of opposition by these States is suffi-
cient." 123 However, the Commission did not define a standard for
acquiescence or absence of opposition; the document therefore does not
offer any guidelines to resolve the central issue of this incident.
In the Eastern Greenland Case'24 the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice had enunciated norms of acquiring sovereignty which bear
on the Falklands incident. The case involved a dispute between Norway
and Denmark over an occupation of territories in Eastern Greenland by
Norwegian hunters, and an accompanying Norwegian Royal Resolution
which vested Norwegian "police powers" in designated local representa-
tives in the region.125 The Court identified the two elements necessary to
establish sovereignty based on continued display of authority: "the inten-
tion and will to exercise such sovereignty and the manifestation of State
activity."' 26 The Court also concluded that certain commercial treaties
with third states showed "a willingness on the part of the States with
which Denmark has contracted to admit her right to exclude Greenland"
as Danish territory. 27 Moreover, the treaties could "be regarded as
demonstrating sufficiently Denmark's will and intention to exercise sov-
ereignty over Greenland."' 128
The Court held that Norwegian protests did not alter the sovereign
character of those acts, and declared unlawful the Norwegian occupa-
tion. Because the facts of this case are inverted in the Falklands inci-
dent-in particular, Argentina and Denmark are in opposite roles-the
holding is relevant to this Article mainly for its recognition of commer-
cial treaties with third parties as a means of establishing sovereignty.
Displays of sovereignty by one state and acquiescence by another were
121. Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, [1962] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 1, 13, para. 80, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/143/1962.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53 (Judgment of Apr. 5, 1933).
125. Id. at 42-43. The Norwegian occupation had occurred in the context of a long histor-
ical dispute.
126. Id. at 63.
127. Id. at 51.
128. Id. at 52.
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decisive factors in the acquisition of title in the Island of Palmas Case. 129
The United States founded its claim to an island off southern Mindanao
on principles of discovery, recognition by treaty, 130 and contiguity.13 1
The Netherlands based its claim on peaceful and continuous display of
state authority over the island, which, according to the arbitrator,
"would in international law prevail over a title of acquisition of sover-
eignty not followed by actual display of State authority."'132
With regard to the length of time of the display of sovereignty, the
Arbitrator noted that although
there are considerable gaps in the evidence of [Dutch] continuous display
* , * it is not necessary that the display of sovereignty should go back to a
very far distant period. It may suffice that such display existed in 1898, and
had already existed as continuous and peaceful before that date long
enough to enable any Power who might have considered herself as possess-
ing sovereignty over the island, or having a claim to sovereignty, to have,
according to local conditions, a reasonable possibility for ascertaining the
existence of a state of things contrary to her real or alleged rights.133
Again, although the facts of Island of Palmas are inapposite to those of
the Falklands incident, the case further proves that signalling processes
form part of the customary norms relating to territorial claims which
bear on the actions of Great Britian and Argentina.
The other reference point in customary international law regarding
signalling norms is the Clipperton Island Case.'34 In that case, the arbi-
trator held that France had given sufficient public "notoriety" to its 1858
unilateral declaration of sovereignty over an island some 570 miles south-
west of Mexico to constitute constructive notice upon Mexico of the
French claim.135 Although France never occupied the island after
promulgating its sovereignty claim, an 1897 Mexican occupation of the
island was held invalid because there was "no reason to suppose that
France. . . subsequently lost her right by derelictio, since she never had
129. (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829 (1929).
130. By the Treaty of December 10, 1898, T.S. No. 343, 30 Stat. 1754, Spain ceded the
Philippines to the United States.
131. 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 837.
132. Id. at 867.
133. Id. The arbitrator continued:
It is not necessary that the display of sovereignty should be established as having begun at
a precise epoch; it suffices that it had existed at the critical period preceding the year 1898.
It is quite natural that the establishment of sovereignty may be the outcome of a slow
evolution, of a progressive intensification of State control. This is particularly the case, if
sovereignty is acquired by the establishment of the suzerainty of a colonial Power over a
native State, and in regard to outlying possessions of such a vassal State.
Id.
134. (Fr. v. Mex.), reprinted in 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1931).
135. Id. at 394.
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the animus of abandoning the island."1 36
V. International Appraisal of Lawfulness
The international community did not apply norms of tacit communi-
cation in its evaluation of the merits of the parties' claims. Since neither
party to the dispute publicly addressed the question of whether Argen-
tina could justifiably interpret prior British actions as acquiescence in the
Argentine claim to title, the international community did not have the
opportunity to consider such a contention.
Individual states and other international actors frequently make policy
judgments on the basis of signals and precedents. 137 The international
appraisal of the lawfulness of the Argentine invasion would not be harsh
if British signals were shown to have in some way invited such an
invasion.
VI. Outcome
The outcome of the Falklands incident, in the first instance, was a total
British military victory and recapture of the Falklands and Dependen-
cies. By the magnitude and scope of its military outcome, that recapture
probably overshadows all prior incidents in the area. These events broke
a more or less constant line of precedent, indicating British acquiescence
in the face of Argentine territorial impositions. The official British posi-
tion on sovereignty now includes territorial control as a source of legiti-
macy for their claim of title to the Falklands.
VII. Writer's Appraisal
In analyzing the parties' interpretation of each others' signals, it
should be kept in mind that both sides viewed the regional territorial
dispute comprehensively. It would be tempting to distinguish formally
between the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies and conclude that
official Argentine displays of authority took place on Dependencies but
not on Falklands soil. However this distinction would be misleading: the
whole region, Falklands and Dependencies, was the subject of a single
dispute. Neither the pattern of signals nor official policy drew serious
distinctions between one archipelago and the other.
From the Argentine point of view, British governments signalled al-
most consistently that the United Kingdom was not serious about keep-
136. Id.
137. See eg., G. SNYDER, supra note 1, at 5-16 (use of signals to deter potential
aggressors).
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ing control of the disputed area. The British repeatedly acquiesced in
specific Argentine assertions of authority, including the seizure of Depen-
dencies' territory in Southern Thule and South Georgia, and the conclu-
sion of a Soviet-Argentine economic cooperation treaty that implicitly
recognized Argentine sovereignty over the Falklands. British govern-
ments concluded agreements with the Argentines establishing a special
relationship between the Islanders and Argentina, including an exemp-
tion for Islanders from Argentine military service. As noted, these ex-
emptions would be meaningful only if the Islanders were to become
Argentines. Similarly, the British weakened their ties to the Islands by
withdrawing HMS Endurance from South Atlantic service despite the
March 1982 Argentine occupation of South Georgia and by enacting the
1981 Nationality Act that denied British nationality to many native Fal-
klanders.1 38 Therefore, considering the preceding discussion of interna-
tional law and the facts surrounding the dispute-including the lack of
British opposition to Resolution 2065 classifying the Falkland Islands
among territories in the process of decolonization-it is reasonable to
conclude that Britain signalled to Argentina that it was surrendering its
sovereignty claim.
The British counterclaim acknowledges that this analysis has some
merit, but asserts that Britain never signalled its readiness to acquiesce to
an Argentine military occupation of the entire Falklands archipelago.
Since the counterclaim relies heavily on assertions about what Britain
intended to signal, resort must be made to British intelligence assess-
ments, now made public in the Franks Report, to infer what the British
government actually knew. Knowing what the government intended
would help in assessing the reasons for the failure to communicate it.
The Franks Report states that shortly after the Southern Thule landing
was discovered, British intelligence reported that the Commander-in-
Chief of the Argentine Navy had probably approved the landing during
the prior months. 139 Moreover, earlier that year the British Joint Intelli-
gence Committee had reported that the new Argentine government was
likely to have high expectations for the resolution of the Falklands dis-
pute.Y40 The British cannot credibly claim that they were uncertain
whether the "scrap-metal dealers" on Southern Thule were instruments
of Argentine authorities or that the deterioration of the dispute was a
138. M. HASTINGS & S. JENKINS, supra note 5, at 43-44; A. GAVSHON & D. RiCE, supra
note 23, at 11-12.
139. FRANKS REPORT, supra note 29, para. 52.
140. Id. para. 50.
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surprise.14 1
On the other hand, there are indications that the British government
still intended the eventual settlement of the dispute to be a peaceful one.
After the Southern Thule incident, British policy was to retain sover-
eignty for as long as possible, while making piecemeal concessions to the
Argentines on maritime resources and the Dependencies. 142 In that man-
ner, the British government hoped to buy time to persuade the British
public to accept concessions on sovereignty.1 43 Whitehall saw a joint
leaseback alternative, linked to economic cooperation, as the most likely
solution to the dispute. 144
After the Thatcher government came to power, it decided at first to
pursue the same policy. Its review of British options listed three possibili-
ties: (i) "Fortress Falklands," (ii) no concessions on sovereignty while
negotiations dragged on, and (iii) substantive negotiations on sover-
eignty. 145 Lord Carrington persuaded the Defence Committee to explore
the third option as the only one which could avert an Argentine military
"invasion," 146 but Islander objections derailed any renewed considera-
tion of a leaseback option in early January 1981.147 As a result, it appears
that British policy reverted to option (ii). The British pursued this course
despite the knowledge-demonstrated in the Defence Committee's ra-
tionale for preferring option (iii)--that option (ii) was not likely to avert
an Argentine military response. British policy towards the Falklands in
early 1982 took a risk on the possibility of Argentine military action,
although it conceded nothing on sovereignty and provided inadequately
for the islands' defense. At best, that was a confusing policy.
Conclusion
The Argentines did not anticipate that their invasion would shock the
British government into a fundamentally different mode of operation,
rendering all previous signals and expectations irrelevant. There were in
141. British intelligence also had concluded that although the Argentine military had re-
frained earlier from carrying out adventurist acts that would increase President Per6n's popu-
larity, its seizure of power had freed it from that constraint. FRANKS REPORT, supra note 29,
paras. 41, 49, 50. See also id. para. 75 (On October 12, 1979, Lord Carrington told the Prime
Minister and other Defence Committee members that "continuing talks but without making
any concessions on sovereignty ... carried a serious threat of invasion.").
142. Id. para. 61.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. para. 73.
146. Id. paras. 75, 80.
147. Id. para. 83. (Falklands Joint Council urged that "the British delegation should seek
an agreement to freeze the dispute over sovereignty for a specified period of time").
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fact no rules of conduct gleaned from signals which could say what Brit-
ain would do in the event of a large Argentine military occupation.
The inherent imprecision of tacit communication is apparent. A signal
by definition is sent without a memorandum explaining its exact meaning
as applied to various fact situations. Parliamentary opposition forced
British cabinets to resort to tacit communication, a medium which could
not accurately express the limits of British acquiescence to Argentine
expansion. 148
The expectations established by British signals in the South Atlantic
probably would have supported other Argentine actions short of invasion
of the Falklands. For example, it seems that Britain would have done
nothing to prevent quiet Argentine exploitation of fishing resources in
Falklands waters. Similarly, the dispute in 1980-81 over oil exploration
148. Complex reasons, including divided authority within the British government, occa-
sional bureaucratic irrationality, and inherent imprecision of tacit communication, underlay
the Cabinet's decision. First, the demands of the House of Commons that the Islanders'
wishes be guaranteed before any transfer of sovereignty could take place conflicted with For-
eign Office policy as expressed in Resolution 2065 and in subsequent British acquiescence to
Argentine displays of sovereign authority. See supra note 26.
The origins of this conflict between the Commons and the Cabinet can be traced to the
government row over the Memorandum of Understanding. The Memorandum's importance
became evident in subsequent years. Britain seemed to follow two conflicting policies with
regard to the Falklands dispute. After the Memorandum of Understanding was abandoned,
the official position followed Commons's demands that Britain would transfer title only with
Islander consent. Nevertheless, British actions unofficially signalled an unconditional though
gradual withdrawal of British interests and a general British animus derelinquendi towards the
territory and its inhabitants.
Who was speaking for Britain and under what authority? Again there are formal and infor-
mal approaches to the problem. The Cabinet formally charged the Foreign Office with Falk-
lands policy and the Defence Ministry with their defense against armed threat. But the
Commons exercised a practical check on the Cabinet's ability to speak for Britain. The distri-
bution of political authority between Whitehall and Westminster depended on the factual cir-
cumstances in which authority would be exercised. On April 2, 1982, with the invasion of
British-held territory causing a national crisis, the House of Commons forcefully demanded
that the Prime Minister choose between action and resignation. See WAR IN FALKLANDS,
supra note 6, at 98 ("[t]here was only one way she could respond: by promising to get the
islands back").
A second cause of ambiguity is the irrationality common to modem bureaucracies. Rela-
tively mundane decisions, such as whether to take an icebreaker out of service, or whether to
permit a few chauvinists to wave Argentine flags over remote rocks, can be inconsistent with
the national interests of a complex state. The overwhelming importance of cost-cutting in the
British bureaucracy during Sir Geoffrey Howe's tenure at the Exchequer made a rational deci-
sion about keeping HMS Endurance in service impossible at a crucial juncture in the dispute.
See M. HASTINGS & S. JENKINS, supra note 5, at 53. In context, Lord Carrington's view that
decommissioning HMS Endurance would weaken the British sovereignty claim could have
been seen as an argument of special interests against cost-cutting measures.
The budgetary pressures which conditioned the March 1982 decision to decommission the
Endurance became totally irrelevant within a few days. The Argentine invasion abruptly reor-
dered official priorities; national interests that had been compromised earlier suddenly became
the overriding national concern.
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in Magallanes Este1 49 was unlikely to provoke a serious British challenge
to Argentine oil activity, as opposed to a challenge to private oil com-
pany drilling or production. The British probably would have lost much
more in economic terms than they could have gained by destabilizing the
military situation around the Falklands. The Shackleton Report noted
that it would not have been realistic for Britain to develop Falklands oil
or fishing resources without Argentine cooperation.
In sum, the operative limitations on Argentina centered less on tactical
particulars, such as whether Argentina could set up a base covertly in
populated Falklands territories, than on the British government's funda-
mental need to avoid public humiliation. Britain's actions were irrespon-
sible in that they communicated opportunities for Argentina but gave
little or no hint of the limitations. Such limitations could have been sig-
nalled, for example, by a substantial strengthening of the British garrison
on the Falkland Islands after the Southern Thule incident. The incident
shows that the process of signalling requires communication of both op-
portunities and limits in order to avoid unintended and potentially dan-
gerous misunderstandings.
Having established what Britain was in fact signalling to Argentina,
one should now'address the last questions: How did this incident affect
the norms of international tacit communication? Have those norms been
strengthened or weakened?
The outcome of this incident will probably weaken international confi-
dence in the process of signalling. Ruling elites tend to judge by concrete
results, and their willingness to rely on a norm depends on its past per-
formance.1 50 The result of Argentina's reliance on the norms in this Inci-
dent was armed conflict, reversion to the status quo ante regarding
effective British control of the Falklands, and ultimately the fall of the
Argentine government.1 51 Moreover, given the accumulation of British
signals, the Argentine government could not be accused of incompetence
in interpreting them.
The Falklands incident thus appears to have exposed fundamental de-
fects in the norms of territorial signalling. The utility of signals depends
in large part on their ability to tacitly communicate true intentions. If
governments cannot speak with credibility at the level of generality on
which signals operate, then the credibility of signals suffers. If govern-
149. A. SILENZI DE STAGNI, supra note 90, at 138-42. See also Report of the Special Com-
mittee, supra note 4, at 28-29.
150. See Reisman, The Incident as a Decisional Unit in International Law, 10 YALE J.
INT'L L. 3 (1984) ("[n]aturally, the weight accorded prescriptive norms will vary with. . . the
effectiveness of the legal system enforcing the norms.").
151. WAR IN FALKLANDS, supra note 6, at 282.
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ments are sometimes unable to take into account all relevant factors in
deciding to send a signal, distinguishing between high national interests
and secondary policy goals, then their signals may not be confidently
relied upon to form expectations of their future behavior.
Signals shape international behavior and conceptions of lawfulness
that affect common ideas of international law. The sequence of signals
that passed between Britain and Argentina shaped conclusions of lawful-
ness on each side; international norms against the use of force were not
exclusively, or even primarily, controlling. The parties alone determined
which uses of force would obtain acquiescence. They created their own
expectations by signalling, just as two parties create their own expecta-
tions in a contract defining a relationship of mutual rights and obliga-
tions. The dispute escalated into armed conflict partly because the
language of their agreement-customary signalling norms-was too
vague. Both parties made and acted on unilateral interpretations of the
other's signals; norms of signalling, existing at a high level of generality,
could not and did not provide adequate criteria to assess the bureau-
cratic, fiscal, and domestic political components of the signals. Whereas
an international court or arbitral tribunal can apply territorial signalling
norms with the discretion conferred upon it by the parties, the same in-
dicators may be too imprecise to be an effective means of conflict limita-
tion between states not bound by the interpretations of an authoritative
third party.
Finally, if signals are the primary international language for the com-
munication of state intentions, and if the decline of the post-1945 model
of international order is being replaced by a realpolitik bilateral or multi-
lateral contractarian model, then the general limits of signalling revealed
in the Falkdands incident suggest the limits of any contractarian model of
international order. In order for there to be a meeting of the minds there
must first be a common language.
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